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On the Logical Form of
Imperfective Aspect
Denis Delfitto
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I will lay out the foundations of a theory of imperfective tenses
(including at least the present tense and the so-called imperfect in Romance lan-
guages) according to which present tense predicates (and, more generally, imper-
fectively marked predicates) are uniformly mapped into subject-predicate logical
formats. The analysis of imperfective aspect in terms of predication will be argued to
provide a uniform account of the two main readings of imperfective predicates (the
so-called progressive reading, by means of which a sentence is interpreted as a report
on the passing scene, and the so-called habitual reading, by means of which a sen-
tence is given generic import).
On the negative side, I will argue that two rather widespread and influential anal-
yses of the way in which imperfective sentences are assumed to yield progressive and
habitual readings are empirically not tenable and conceptually ill founded. One of
these analyses is the view of the imperfect as an aspectually sensitive tense, according
to which the imperfect imposes a kind of aspectual constraint on the eventuality
description to which it applies, to the e¤ect that the latter is interpreted as a state or
as a process (the progressive reading is assumed to follow from this aspectual con-
straint). I will not only take issue with this conception of the imperfect but also
challenge the strictly related view that the model-theoretic notions underlying aktion-
sart and grammatical aspect are essentially the same. The second analysis that I
intend to reject corresponds to the view of the imperfect as a polarity tense that trig-
gers the presence of a generalized quantifier with modal force (the so-called Gen),
quantifying over individuals and/or eventualities: the habitual reading is assumed to
follow from this interpretation of Gen as a relation between two classes of even-
tualities. I will argue against this quantificational analysis (the so-called relational
analysis of genericity) by arguing that there is no way to fix the properties of Gen
in a precise and noncontradictory way, endorsing a neo-Carlsonian view of generic
sentences as subject-predicate structures.
On the positive side, I will argue that the predicational analysis of imperfective
aspect permits an elegant unification of the logical form assigned to progressives and
habituals, leading to the important insight that the semantic instruction encoded by
imperfective morphology is not ambiguous, contrary to what was implicitly held by
traditional analyses. Moreover, I will take the position that (at least in Romance and
Germanic) grammatical aspect is the locus where the distinction between ‘‘categori-
cal’’ sentences (consisting in the ascription of a property to a subject) and ‘‘thetical’’
sentences (roughly consisting in the presentation of an eventuality) is grammatically
encoded. In this way, the classical debate in philosophy of language over whether
the subject-predicate format is an essential ingredient of the definition of sentence
(opposing the logical/rationalistic tradition of linguistic analysis mostly identified
with Port-Royal to philosophers like Brentano and linguists like Marty and Miklo-
sich; see especially Gra‰ 2001) is shown to hinge less on an abstract philosophical
choice and more on concrete empirical issues concerning the role of grammatical
aspect (and in particular the imperfective/perfective opposition) as the morpho-
syntactic regulator of the choice between a subject-predicate format and an eventive
format.
Last but not least, I will argue that the predicational analysis of imperfective tenses
is able to provide a principled and elegant solution for a still poorly understood set of
phenomena concerning the licensing of existential interpretations of argument bare
nouns with the present tense in English. In a nutshell, the problem consists in the fact
that neither Carlson’s (1980) theory (holding that existential bare nouns are licensed
by stage-level predicates) nor Kratzer’s (1995) theory (holding that existential bare
nouns depend on certain di¤erences in argument structure between stage-level and
individual-level predicates) provides a satisfactory solution for this set of facts (which
I would like to dub the present tense paradox). I will show that this paradox can be
solved under the hypothesis that existential interpretations are licensed only in struc-
tures where another of the predicate’s arguments may count as a subject of predica-
tion, thus providing a nontrivial empirical argument in favor of the predicational
analysis of genericity.
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.2, I will review what I believe to be
wrong conceptions of imperfective aspect, arguing against their empirical and con-
ceptual feasibility. In section 4.3, I will present a unifying analysis of progressives
and habituals, under the basic insight that the logical form of imperfectivity is pred-
ication. In section 4.4, I will deal with the present tense paradox in English. Finally, I
will draw some general conclusions concerning the proposed logical form of imper-
fective aspect and the underlying conception of grammatical aspect.
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4.2 Two Wrong Conceptions of Imperfective Tenses
4.2.1 The Imperfect as a Tense of Aspectual Polarity
The first analysis I intend to take issue with conceives of the imperfect in terms of
an aspectually sensitive tense. This means that the imperfect not only expresses the
notional content of PAST but also crucially applies to eventuality descriptions that
are either states or processes. Exemplifying with French (see de Swart 1998), the
canonical usage of the imperfect manifests itself in sentences such as (1) (expressing a
state), and not in sentences such as (2) (expressing a culminated event, a so-called
accomplishment in the Vendlerian terminology), where a perfective tense should in-
stead be used, as in (3).
(1) Anne e´tait triste.
‘Anne was-IMP sad.’
(2) Anne e´crivait une lettre.
‘Anne wrote-IMP a letter.’
(3) Anne e´crivit une lettre.
‘Anne wrote-PERF a letter.’
The use of the imperfect in noncanonical cases such as (2), where it applies to verbs
denoting culminated events, is explained by resorting to a mechanism of aspectual
‘‘coercion’’: since the imperfect applies to the wrong lexical meaning (i.e., to a verb
that does not refer to a state/process), this lexical meaning is suitably modified in
order to yield an acceptable input to the compositional rule. In particular, the sen-
tence in (2) will be understood either as a habitual (roughly, Anne had the habit of
writing a letter) or as a progressive (Anne was in the process of writing a letter). In
this way, the original interpretation of the predicate ‘write a letter’ as a culminated
event is turned into the interpretation of a state/process. Moreover, interpreting the
imperfect in terms of aspectual coercion has the apparent advantage of assuming the
same model-theoretic notions for the analysis of aktionsart and grammatical aspect.
Aktionsart concerns the property of lexical meaning according to which predicates
refer either to states/processes or to culminated eventualities of di¤erent types. Gram-
matical aspect (as exemplified by the aspectual marking proper to the imperfect) is
simply a sort of aspectual operator (expressed by inflectional morphology) turning
predicates of a certain class (e.g., those referring to culminated events) into predicates
of another class (e.g., those referring to states/processes). In other words, the under-
lying insight is that assuming a certain event ontology (i.e., a certain partition of the
domain of eventualities over which predicate variables are assumed to vary) will help
in understanding both aktionsart distinctions at the level of lexical meaning and
aspectual distinctions at the level of inflectional morphology. Arguing against the
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analysis of the imperfect that I have just sketched thus entails arguing against the
proposed conflation of the notional value of grammatical aspect with the notional
value of aktionsart.
Let us turn thus to the announced criticism of the view of the imperfect as an
aspectual operator mapping accomplishments into states/processes. In a nutshell, the
point I wish to make is that coercion is simply not able to predict the actual inter-
pretation of imperfective sentences. Consider first how aspectual coercion operates
in languages such as English when there is a clash between the interpretation of the
verbal predicate as a culminated event and the temporal interpretation of a location
adverb. The standard situation is shown in (4)–(5).
(4) The pianist played the sonata for eight hours.
(5) For months, the train arrived late.
In both cases, the semantic clash is solved by turning the telic predicate into a predi-
cate referring to iterative events: the reference is either to repeated executions of the
sonata or to repeated late arrivals. The interpretation of (4)–(5) clearly shows that
the iterative reading is a suitable way of turning telic predicates into durative predi-
cates (i.e., predicates referring to states/processes). If the imperfect is essentially an
operator mapping culminated events into states/processes, we clearly predict that the
realization of (4)–(5) as imperfective sentences will give rise to the iterative reading.
To put it in a stronger form, if the imperfect corresponds to a mechanism of gram-
matically encoded aspectual coercion, there is no reason to expect that grammati-
cal encoding will be less e¤ective than the kind of pragmatically encoded coercion
instantiated in (4)–(5) in producing the iterative reading of the imperfective equiv-
alents of (4)–(5). Unfortunately, what we find is that the iterative reading cannot be
expressed by the imperfect in languages such as French and Italian. Using the latter
for illustration, notice that (6) (the imperfective equivalent of (4) in Italian) and (7)
(the imperfective equivalent of (5)) cannot be assigned an iterative reading, for which
a perfective tense is required, as shown in (8) and (9). Analogous facts hold in
French.
(6) Il pianista eseguiva la sonata per otto ore.
(*iterative, OK habitual)
‘The pianist played-IMP the sonata for eight hours.’
(7) Per mesi, il treno arrivava in ritardo.
(*iterative, OK habitual)
‘For months, the train arrived-IMP late.’
(8) Il pianista eseguı` la sonata per otto ore.
(OK iterative, *habitual)
‘The pianist played-PERF the sonata for eight hours.’
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(9) Per mesi, il treno arrivo` in ritardo.
(OK iterative, *habitual)
‘For months, the train arrived-PERF late.’
Of course, one might try to say that the habitual reading (which is in fact the only
legitimate reading of (6) and (7)) is simply a variant of the iterative reading and is
actually preferred (admittedly for unclear reasons) to the iterative reading whenever
grammatically induced aspectual coercion applies. However, the point is that the
di¤erence between the durative and the habitual readings has nothing to do with the
conversion of culminated eventualities into states or processes. The di¤erence con-
cerns the modal force proper to the habitual reading, which is completely absent
from the iterative reading. To see this, consider the following hypothetical situation.
Suppose that in the 1940s the Teatro alla Scala had the sadistic habit of having
a poor pianist playing one of Beethoven’s sonatas for eight hours at every yearly
opening of the concert season. Suppose that this tradition was in fact subsumed
under the o‰cial regulations of the theater but underwent a forced interruption dur-
ing the war—say, in the period 1942–1945. In these circumstances, one might actu-
ally utter a sentence like (10) salva veritate, while its perfective counterpart in (11)
would be open to the objection that the crazy performance at stake did not take
place in certain years. The reason is that the imperfective sentence in (10) may be
interpreted in the worlds of a deontic modal base in which everything happens
according to the theater regulations and without the intervention of limiting external
factors, whereas the perfective sentence in (11) is necessarily interpreted in the real
world (hence the falsity flavor of (11)).
(10) Negli anni quaranta, ad ogni inizio di stagione, il pianista eseguiva la sonata di
Beethoven per otto ore.
‘In the forties, at every season opening, the pianist played-IMP Beethoven’s
sonata for eight hours.’
(11) Negli anni quaranta, ad ogni inizio di stagione, il pianista eseguı` la sonata di
Beethoven per otto ore.
‘In the forties, at every season opening, the pianist played-PERF Beethoven’s
sonata for eight hours.’
The conclusion I would like to draw from the discussion above is that the imperfect
does not simply map telic predicates into durative predicates. Rather, it adds a modal
dimension to the semantics of the past tense. In e¤ect, one cannot even propose that
mapping to durative predicates is an essential ingredient of the semantics of the im-
perfect, since the pure durative readings (like the iterative one) are not available as
legitimate readings of imperfective sentences.
This casts serious doubts on the analysis of the imperfect as a polarity tense that
applies only to states/processes. Even more significantly, it casts serious doubts on
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the possibility of limiting the semantics of grammatical aspect to the same onto-
logical domain that is relevant for aktionsart. These doubts are independently
confirmed by the behavior of aspectually ambiguous verbs like impugnare (‘to hold
something’ or ‘to get hold of something’) in Italian. Let us now turn to the analysis
of this phenomenon, essentially following the argumentation developed in Bertinetto
2001. According to one of its two lexical meanings (‘to get hold of something’),
impugnare refers to a culminated event; according to the other, it refers to a process
(‘to hold something’). The view of the imperfect as a polarity tense selecting states/
processes clearly predicts that the usage of impugnare in the imperfect should be
unmarked with the meaning ‘to hold something’ and marked with the meaning ‘to
get hold of something’. At first sight, the prediction is borne out, as shown by the
following examples in Italian (drawn from Bertinetto 2001):
(12) Leo impugno` la pistola: tutt’intorno si fece subito silenzio.
‘Leo got hold-PERF of his gun: all around a sudden silence arose.’
(13) Quando Lia entro`, Leo impugnava la pistola.
‘When Lia came in, Leo held-IMP the gun.’
However, it is not di‰cult to find cases where a perfective form combines with the
durative meaning (14) and cases where the imperfect combines with predicates refer-
ring to culminated events (15).
(14) Leo impugno` saldamente la pistola finche´ la sparatoria non finı`.
‘Leo firmly held-PERF his gun until the shooting was over.’
(15) Quando Leo impugnava la pistola, Lia aveva paura.
‘When Leo got hold-IMP of his gun, Lia was afraid.’
The striking fact about (15) is that in habitual sentences of this sort, aspectual coer-
cion does not apply, contrary to the expectations raised by the theory of the imper-
fect as an aspectually sensitive tense. There is indeed no shift from the telic meaning
of impugnare to its durative counterpart, since impugnare retains the original mean-
ing ‘to get hold of something’ in (15). Notice that one may try to rescue aspectual
coercion by proposing that the habitual variant of ‘to get hold of something’ qualifies
as durative, satisfying as such the selectional requirements on the eventuality to
which the imperfect applies. In fact, we saw earlier that French sentences such as
Anne e´crivait une lettre ‘Anne wrote-imp a letter’ are normally interpreted either as
habituals or as progressives. Above I provided a substantial argument against the
view of habituality as an instantiation of the durative reading, but let us assume here,
for the sake of the argument, that my objections can be circumvented. In a nutshell,
the hypothetical rescuing strategy would claim that shifting the lexical meaning of ‘to
get hold of something’ into its durative counterpart would not be required, since both
the progressive and the telic variant of the predicate would su‰ce for the mapping
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into states/processes. The trouble with this strategy is that the actual interpretation
of (13) would represent an unsolvable puzzle. Namely, notice that (13) is assigned the
reading ‘Leo was holding the gun’ in Italian, while the progressive reading of the
telic counterpart of impugnare is completely excluded (*‘Leo was getting hold of
the gun’). If (15) is taken to show that the mapping into states/processes does not
require a change of lexical meaning with predicates ambiguous between a telic and a
durative reading, one would predict that there is no reason for the imperfect not to
apply to the telic variant of impugnare and coerce it into its progressive reading (‘to
be getting hold of something’). The exclusion of this reading thus remains completely
unexplained.
I take these facts to corroborate the view that aspectual coercion (and the related
interpretation of the imperfect as a tense of aspectual polarity) cannot be the key to a
proper understanding of the logical form and semantics of the imperfect.
The general conclusion I would like to draw is that aktionsart and grammatical
aspect are orthogonal notions that make reference to distinct ontological properties
of the domain in which they are interpreted. Adopting and somewhat extending the
analysis advocated in Higginbotham 2000, I take aktionsart to be a lexical category
that encodes the aspect of the ontological constitution of events that has to do with
the homogeneity of its subparts. In a Davidsonian framework, the di¤erence between
telic predicates and states/processes can thus be expressed by associating telic predi-
cates with a lexical structure containing two distinct event variables, corresponding
to the two nonhomogeneous subparts of the telic eventuality (the processual part and
the telos).
(16) a. Telic: DIE he1, e2i
b. Atelic: WALK he1i
Grammatical aspect is (at least in Romance/Germanic) an inflectional category that
encodes a rather di¤erent aspect of the ontological constitution of events: their hav-
ing (or not having) a culmination. This property is shared both by nonhomogeneous
(telic) predicates like die and by homogeneous (process-denoting) predicates like
walk, as is confirmed by the full legitimacy of the perfective variant of walk in Italian
(17a) and by the results of the discussion above concerning cases like (14) (see
Delfitto 2002a for a detailed discussion of some of the comparative issues at stake
here). Formally, I interpret perfective marking as an inflectional category that acts
as a predicate modifier: lQle [Q(e)bCulm(e)]. In this way, the interpretation of the
perfective realization of, say, walk will be something along the lines of (17b).
(17) a. Leo cammino` per tre ore.
‘Leo walked-PERF for three hours.’
b. WALKPERF ¼ lQle [Q(e)bCulm(e)]$ le [walk(e)bCulm(e)]
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In this perspective, imperfective aspect will be the default case: an imperfectively
marked predicate will simply express neutral information about whether the predicate
refers to a culminated or to a nonculminated eventuality. This seems empirically cor-
rect in at least two respects. First, in habitual sentences such as (15) the imperfect
refers to culminated events. Second, and even more importantly, the mereological
aspects of the progressive interpretation of the imperfect (the fact that it refers to
ongoing events or subparts of a culminated event) can be derived as a matter of
implicature, under a straightforward application of Grice’s Maxim of Quantity: the
speaker who knows that the event he or she is referring to has culminated must use
the perfective realization of the predicate (see especially Kearns 1991 for a detailed
discussion of this issue).
Summarizing, we have seen that the view of the imperfect as a tense of aspectual
polarity is fundamentally misguided. Empirically, it leads to a number of wrong pre-
dictions and to a vacuous dependence on aspectual coercion. Conceptually, it does
not properly acknowledge that the imperfect (and grammatical aspect quite gener-
ally) encodes semantic instructions that cannot be reduced to a form of grammati-
cally encoded aspectual coercion, consisting in the mapping of predicates referring
to culminated events into predicates referring to durative events (states/processes).
Moreover, we have seen that the imperfect, far from selecting predicates of states/
processes, in fact expresses neutral semantic information regarding the choice be-
tween culminated and nonculminated events.
4.2.2 The Quantificational Analysis of the Imperfect
Another influential analysis of imperfective aspect takes the present tense and the
imperfect of stage-level predicates to encode a polarity feature that triggers the pres-
ence of a phonetically empty adverb of quantification (Q-adverb) with modal import
(see especially Chierchia 1995). In this way, the French sentence (2) (restated here as
(18)) is assigned the logical form in (19) (where C is a two-place predicative variable
expressing a contextually determined relation between individuals and events in the
past).
(18) Jean e´crivait une lettre.
(19) Gen [C(Jean, e)] [by (lettre(y)bAgent(Jean, e)bTheme(y, e))]
The truth-conditions informally expressed by (19) are that in all worlds of the rele-
vant modal base, the occasions that favored writing a letter (in some contextually
defined way) were occasions in which Jean actually wrote a letter. This analysis of
the imperfect thus combines naturally with the relational view of genericity that
takes English present tense sentences such as (20) to correspond with logical forms
like (21).
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(20) Typhoons arise in this part of the Pacific.
(21) Gen(l ) [this-part-of-the-Pacific(l )] [bx (typhoon(x)barise-in(x, l ))]
Habitual sentences such as (18) are thus simply another instance of the relational in-
terpretation of generic sentences (see especially Wilkinson 1991; Kratzer 1995).
In what follows, I will briefly present some empirical arguments against the view
that the logical form of habituals is quantificational and that genericity involves the
presence of a phonetically unrealized Q-adverb (see Delfitto 2002a for a more exten-
sive discussion of the empirical shortcomings of the quantificational/relational view
of genericity).
First argument. If the generic reading follows from the presence of an empty
Q-adverb, we do not expect to find generic readings in sentences that contain overtly
realized Q-adverbs. The reason is straightforward: if the overt Q-adverb binds the
Davidsonian event variable associated with the predicate, the presence of Gen yields
a violation of the constraint on vacuous quantification (i.e., there is no free variable
for Gen to quantify over). To exemplify, a sentence like (22) would be assigned the
logical form in (23).
(22) Gli italiani lavoravano spesso duramente.
‘Italians often worked-IMP hard.’
(23) For many e [C(I , e)] [work-hard(I , e)]
However, sentences containing extensional Q-adverbs instead of the implicit Gen
exhibit the usual modal e¤ects that should be yielded by Gen, as is shown by the
observation that the subject in (22) naturally refers to ‘whoever may have turned out
to be an Italian in the past’ and not to some specific groups or generations of Italians
who lived in the past. On the other hand, one cannot assume that these modal e¤ects
follow from the semantics of the overt Q-adverb spesso ‘often’, since the perfective
counterpart of (22) in (24) can be interpreted only with the subject referring to some
specific groups or generations of Italians who lived in the past.
(24) Gli italiani lavorarono spesso duramente.
‘Italians often worked-PERF hard.’
This means that the imperfective marking proper to (22) must encode a modal read-
ing without enforcing, however, the presence of the modalized Q-adverb Gen (whose
combination with spesso would yield vacuous quantification). The solution I intend
to submit consists in the hypothesis that imperfective morphology encodes a subject-
predicate logical format. As a consequence, (22) is associated with the logical form in
(25), roughly stating that ‘it is a property of Italians that they worked hard in many
relevant situations in the past’.
(25) [lx Many e [C(I , e)] [work-hard(I , e)]] (Italians)
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If the modal reading is assumed to follow from the subject-predicate format, Gen can
be dispensed with and there is no danger of vacuous quantification.
Second argument. Dobrovie-Sorin and Laca (1996) emphasize that the presence of
Gen is empirically well supported only in contexts involving singular indefinites (see
Delfitto 2002a for a detailed comparative analysis of the behavior of singular and
plural indefinites). In particular, the behavior of singular indefinites suggests that
Gen is licensed only in analytic/taxonomic contexts. This would explain why (26)
is acceptable as a generic sentence, whereas (27) is not (a madrigal must be poly-
phonic in order to be a madrigal, but there are of course many madrigals that are not
popular).
(26) A madrigal is polyphonic.
(27) ??A madrigal is popular. (generic)
The most straightforward explanation for the grammaticality contrast between (26)
and (27) is that singular indefinites are variables, triggering the realization of an
unselective binder in the form of an empty Q-adverb. The hypothesis is thus that the
content of Gen can be recovered only in analytic contexts: in (27), there is thus
no obvious way to identify the empty Q-adverb as a quasi-universal quantifier with
modal force. What is also worth noticing is that the contrast between (26) and (27) is
completely obliterated when the subject indefinites are bare nouns (both (28) and (29)
are perfectly acceptable as generic sentences).
(28) Madrigals are polyphonic.
(29) Madrigals are popular.
These facts naturally follow from the combination of the Carlsonian insight that bare
nouns are names of kinds with the predicational analysis of generic sentences (i.e.,
the hypothesis that the generic reading of (28)–(29) represents the semantics of the
subject-predicate format). The point is that only the singular indefinite in (26)–(27)
introduces a free variable that must be (unselectively) bound by the empty Q-adverb
Gen. Since Gen is licensed only in taxonomic contexts, (26) will turn out to be
acceptable and (27) unacceptable. We conclude that although the (constrained) pres-
ence of Gen is relatively well supported in contexts containing individual free vari-
ables, the absence of any grammaticality contrast between (28) and (29) shows that
the roots of genericity do not lie in adverbial quantification.
Third argument. If Gen is an empty Q-adverb, we expect it to give rise to the
same scope ambiguities that can be detected with overtly realized Q-adverbs. Con-
sider for instance the ambiguity that arises with other scopal elements such as nega-
tion: depending on the position of the Q-adverb, the sentences in (30) are ambiguous
between the reading in (31) and the reading in (32).
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(30) a. Michele non fuma spesso.
‘Michele does not smoke often.’
b. Michele spesso non fuma.
‘Michele often does not smoke.’
(31) It is not the case that Michele often smokes.
(32) It is often the case that Michele does not smoke.
It is striking that this scopal ambiguity does not arise when the Q-adverb is—
allegedly—the empty Gen: the sentence in (33) can be assigned only the reading
corresponding to the logical construal in (32), with the negation in the scope of Gen.
(33) Michele non fuma.
‘Michele does not smoke.’
These overgeneration problems do not arise within the predicational analysis, since
this analysis contends that there is no Gen in (33): the only admissible reading cor-
responds to the ascription of the property ‘lx (x does not smoke)’ to Michele, which
is roughly equivalent, truth-conditionally, to the logical construal in (32).
On the basis of these empirical arguments, I conclude that the quantificational
analysis of habituals is empirically unsatisfactory. It follows that the view of imper-
fective aspect as encoding a polarity feature that triggers the presence of Gen is also
not supported and should therefore be abandoned. In the next section, I turn to the
predicational analysis of imperfectively marked sentences, considering its empirical
and conceptual advantages.
4.3 Imperfective Aspect as Encoding Predication
The hypothesis I would like to put forward here is that verbs that are aspectually
marked as imperfective carry the semantic instruction that their maximal projection
(VP) is to be interpreted as a one-place predicate (logical type he, ti). Within the
current model of syntax, virtually all the verb’s arguments have to vacate the VP as a
result of the syntactic computation. One of the core questions that arise concerns the
semantic nature of the relation between displaced arguments and their VP-internal
traces. If we assume that syntactic movement uniformly reconstructs (in the sense
that displaced arguments can be interpreted in their VP-internal launching site),
traces of movement will not be related to their antecedents by means of predication:
since the launching site potentially hosts the antecedent, there is simply no point in
interpreting it as a predicational trace, that is, as a trace bound by a l-operator. On
the other hand, this is exactly what imperfective marking is supposed to do according
to my hypothesis: it encodes the semantic instruction that one of the verb’s arguments
has to be interpreted predicationally, that is, by means of a l-operator binding a
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variable in the original VP-internal position. The best way of technically implement-
ing this basic insight is as follows. When a verb is marked as imperfective, a des-
ignated functional projection PredP is syntactically realized and one of the verb’s
arguments must be displaced to Spec,PredP: the trace of this argument can be inter-
preted only predicationally, that is, in terms of a l-operator binding a variable (see
Delfitto 2002a, chap. 4, for independent morphosyntactic evidence in favor of the
existence of Pred). Moreover, we can assume that the Pred head is endowed with
specific semantic content, in the sense that it performs ‘‘intensional type shifting’’ on
the constituents that are found in its syntactic domain (the VP complement and the
displaced argument in Spec,PredP, counting as a subject of predication). In this
way, an imperfectively marked sentence will be interpreted as the ascription of the
property expressed by the VP to the individual expressed by the constituent in
Spec,PredP. To exemplify, a present tense sentence such as (34) will give rise to the
syntactic and semantic structures shown in (35).
(34) Firemen use special equipment.
(35)
As can be seen in (35), the rationale of my proposal is that imperfective mark-
ing induces a predicational interpretation of the VP (the VP is essentially a l-
abstract, since the argument displaced to the Pred level cannot be reconstructed
VP-internally). The categorical versus thetical interpretation of a sentence depends
on the predicational versus propositional interpretation of the VP, which constitutes,
in the traditional syntactic terminology, the minimal functional complex associated
with the verb: if the VP is inherently predicational, as is the case in (35), there is no
way to achieve a propositional interpretation of the minimal functional complex of
the verb, that is, a thetical interpretation of the sentence.
The notion of predication that is assumed to be relevant here has to be carefully
distinguished from the syntactic notion of predication (see Williams 1980), as involv-
ing the ‘‘external’’ realization of one of the verb’s arguments. It must also be dis-
tinguished (as pointed out by Jacqueline Gue´ron (personal communication)) from
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the notion of predication that appears to be relevant for all structures where an un-
saturated element (the predicate) combines (in various syntactic ways) with an argu-
ment expression (what we might call ‘‘Fregean predication’’). These structures are
arguably exemplified by clitic left-dislocation in Romance and even by simple clitic-
constructions according to the analysis proposed in Delfitto 2002b, where pronomi-
nal clitics (including those that stand for predicates) are assumed to reopen the
argument position to which they are formally related. The point to be made here is
that in all these cases, functional abstraction appears to feed information structure
(the left-dislocated argument is interpreted as a topic) and applies to both perfective
and imperfective sentences. In fact, many of the sentences involving (left-)dislocated
topics are arguably interpreted as thetical sentences, consisting in the presentation
of an event rather than in the ascription of a property to an individual. Within the
framework proposed here, this fact is captured by assuming that there is an interface
level at which even topics undergo some kind of VP-internal ‘‘logical’’ reconstruction
(say, through l-conversion), on a par with the arguments of V that are syntactically
displaced outside the VP. What imperfective morphology ‘‘encodes,’’ as emphasized
above, is the interface instruction that one of the arguments of V (location arguments
crucially included) is not allowed to reconstruct, either syntactically or ‘‘logically,’’
with the result that there will be no interface representation expressing a ‘‘thetical’’
interpretation of the relevant sentence. Analogously, I intend to propose that perfec-
tive marking does not prevent (parts of ) a syntactic representation from expressing
functional abstraction, possibly feeding specific interpretive (sub)systems, among
them information structure; instead, what perfective marking establishes is the re-
quirement that there be an interface representation where the linguistic expression
corresponding to the VP is viewed as a fully saturated expression (this interface rep-
resentation being relevant for the thetical interpretation of the sentence).
On the basis of these theoretical preliminaries, let us now look briefly at one deci-
sive theoretical merit of the proposed interpretation of imperfective marking as
predication, that is, the possibility of identifying the common denominator of the
two most salient readings of imperfective sentences: the habitual and the progressive.
Let us start with the habitual reading. Under the most fashionable analysis, the
habitual reading corresponds to a relation between two classes of events, and this
relation is expressed by a (possibly implicit) Q-adverb. As already emphasized in
section 4.2, the trouble with this analysis is that the relational interpretation is found
both with imperfective and with perfective predicates. To exemplify, consider the fact
that the interpretation of (36) and (37) in Italian is virtually the same and can be
roughly expressed by the logical representation in (38).
(36) Nel 1922, il preside della Facolta` di Lettere indosso` sempre la cravatta.
‘In 1922, the dean of the Faculty of Arts always wore-PERF a tie.’
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(37) Nel 1922, il preside della Facolta` di Lettere indossava sempre la cravatta.
‘In 1922, the dean of the Faculty of Arts always wore-IMP a tie.’
(38) Ee [t(e)H1922bC(the dean, e)] [wear-a-tie(the dean, e)]
where t(e) denotes the time stretch of event e.
In informal terms, all the events in 1922 in which the dean had the opportunity of
wearing a tie have been events in which the dean actually wore a tie. If what we are
looking for is the di¤erence between perfective marking in (36) and imperfective
marking in (37), it is thus safe to conclude that the di¤erence has nothing to do with
the relational interpretation induced by Q-adverbs (including the implicit Gen, as
discussed in section 4.2).
The truth-conditional di¤erence between (36) and (37) consists in the modal
dimension proper to (37) and absent from (36). To exemplify, let us suppose that
the following hypothetical situation holds. After accurate research in the university
archives, I could determine that in 1922 there could be no opportunity for the dean
to wear a tie on formal occasions, because the university could not function normally
as a result of political turmoil. However, suppose that I could also determine that,
according to the university regulations of 1922, the dean was requested to wear a
tie during any formal ceremony involving sta¤ and students. It is now a fact that,
according to native speakers of Italian, my utterance of (37) (which involves imper-
fective marking) gives rise to a true sentence in the situation just described (where no
formal ceremony took place because of abnormal functioning), while (36) is clearly
evaluated as false in the same circumstances. In other words, the truth of (37), con-
trary to the truth of (36), does not require events of the relevant kind to have taken
place in the real world. Rather, for (37) to be true, it su‰ces that the relation ‘‘wear-
a-tie(the dean, e)’’ holds in all possible situations that conform with the university
regulations. More formally, we can say that (37) is true in the real world if and
only if the relation ‘‘wear-a-tie(the dean, e)’’ holds in all the worlds of the deontic
modal base that is relevant for this relation. Since I have already argued (see section
4.2) that the detected modal import cannot be encoded by Q-adverbs, it is quite
reasonable to let it follow from the semantics of the predicational format. In full
agreement with the discussion above, I propose, for (37), the logical representation in
(39).
(39) [lx Ee [t(e)H1922bC(x, e)] [wear-a-tie(x, e)]] (the dean)
Informally, in 1922 wearing a tie on formal occasions was a property of the dean.
From this discussion, we can conclude that the habitual reading of imperfective
sentences is not due to the presence of Q-adverbs (or of polarity features triggering
the presence of Q-adverbs). Rather, the modal import proper to habitual sentences
follows from their predicational format: if a Q-adverb is present, it will simply induce
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a relational interpretation of the property that is ascribed to the subject of predica-
tion, as is the case in (39).
It is time now to turn to the progressive reading of imperfective sentences. At first
sight, there seems to be no point in arguing that imperfectives interpreted as pro-
gressives are assigned predicational formats at the level of LF. Intuitively, sentences
such as those in (40) instantiate typical thetical structures, since they arguably express
the information that a certain event (viz., the crossing of the street) is developing (i.e.,
Holds) at a certain evaluation time (the time expressed in (40) by the adverb of tem-
poral location).
(40) Alle
at
cinque,
five
Teo
Teo
attraversava
crossed-imp
la
the
strada.
street
‘At five o’clock, Teo was crossing the street.’
Despite these appearances, I will actually argue that even progressives are assigned
a categorical interpretation (i.e., they are interpreted predicationally) when they are
realized as imperfectives.
Before I come to the main issue, some preliminary remarks are in order. As is well
known, the semantics of progressive aspect includes not only event mereology (i.e.,
the possibility of referring to subparts of larger events) but also a set of contextual
factors. In the formal semantics literature, these factors have been most commonly
analyzed in terms of possible worlds/situations (Landman 1991) or in terms of con-
comitant facts and conversational backgrounds (Bonomi 1997). One of the most
debated problems concerns Dowty’s (1979) notion of inertia worlds, according to
which the worlds belonging to the modal base can be characterized by restricting
one’s attention to the most natural development of the event holding at the evalua-
tion time. Suppose one utters (41).
(41) Teo was crossing the street when a car hit him.
According to Dowty’s proposal, (41) is true if and only if its most natural develop-
ment leads to its completion (not necessarily in the real world, where some accident
might have prevented Teo from reaching the other side of the street). The trouble is
that every speaker of English would agree, as a matter of world knowledge, that the
most natural continuation of the event holding at t (the crossing) does not involve
reaching the other side of the street in the situation described in (41), where a car hit
poor Teo. Landman (1991) has proposed a solution to this problem that is informally
based on the idea that the worlds of the modal base have to be those in which only
the ‘‘internal’’ development of the event is considered (in this way, the fact that poor
Teo was hit by the car in (41) is simply put out of the picture in establishing whether
there is a ‘‘possible’’ culmination of the relevant event). The logical form corre-
sponding to (41) will be something like (42) (adapted from Landman 1991).
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(42) be 0 bt [AT(e 0, t)bPROG(e 0, le (crossing(e)bAgent(Teo, e)bTheme(the
street, e))]
Inspection of (42) reveals that the progressive operator PROG is formally analyzed
as a relation between events and predicates of events. The truth-conditions for this
relation are as follows:
(43) [PROG(e,P)bAT(e, t)] is true at w i¤ bw 0 in the continuation branch of e in
w such that eMe 0 and P(e 0) and tHt(e 0) (where t is a function assigning a
temporal extension to events)
What Landman’s formalization satisfactorily captures is the insight that an event e
can be said to hold at t if and only if by inspecting the continuation of e that stems
from the internal constitution of e (continuation branch), we arrive at a possible situ-
ation w 0 (that qualifies as reasonable with respect to the real world w) in which e
culminates (this culminated event being in the extension of the predicate P). In this
way, (41) is correctly predicted to be true if Teo was crossing the street without being
able to reach the other side, because of the accident that happened to him. The point
is that we have the intuition that there is a possible situation qualifying as a reason-
able option for the event initiated in the real world, in which Teo actually reached
the other side of the street. At the same time, we can also account for the clear con-
trast between (41) and sentences of the kind exemplified in (44).
(44) Teo is wiping out the Roman army.
In the case of (44), we want the sentence to be false in a situation in which Teo has
already killed, say, three Roman soldiers and is still busy fighting. Landman’s truth-
conditions correctly capture this intuition: at a given point, the continuation branch
of e (on our way toward culmination) will be in a world w 0 that no longer qualifies as
a reasonable option with respect to the original situation in the real world (e.g., the
world w 0 in which Teo has already killed a thousand Roman soldiers; see also Zucchi
1999, 184). It is worth noting that nonmodal approaches to the semantics of the
progressive (see especially Parsons 1990) cannot capture this di¤erence between (41)
and (44). There, developing events are in the extension of the predicate Hold, while
culminated events are in the extension of the predicate Culminate. However, we do
not know under which conditions the predicate Hold truly applies to e at t. For
instance, in both (41) and (44) the holding event qualifies as a proper subpart of its
culminated counterpart. The trouble is that we want to say that the event of crossing
the street holds at t (41), while the event of wiping out the Roman army does not
hold at t (44). This crucial insight remains dangerously unexpressed in Parsons’s
formalism.
However, despite its merits, Landman’s semantics for the progressive, as it stands,
is unsuited to my purposes, in that it does not properly acknowledge that predicates
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of events can refer, in their basic form, to holding events. This assumption is neces-
sary in order to express the insight that aspectually unmarked forms convey neutral
information about the culmination of the events they refer to: as we have seen in
the previous section, imperfective marking is compatible with reference to culminated
events. In order to see how this feature of Landman’s analysis manifests itself within
the formalism he proposes, notice for instance that in (42) it is only the culminated
event e, but not the developing event e 0, that is said to be in the extension of the
predicate cross. In order to repair this deficiency of Landman’s formalism, while
preserving the crucial advantages of the modal analysis, I will basically adopt
Zucchi’s (1999) proposal, which consists in embedding into a modal framework
Parsons’s (1990) insight that basic forms can refer to developing events. For a sen-
tence such as (41), Zucchi’s analysis would provide the logical form in (45) (adapted
from Zucchi 1999).
(45) be bt [crossing(e)bAgent(e, Teo)bTheme(e, the street)bAT(e, t)b
Hold(e, t, :le [crossing(e)bTheme(e, the street)])]
What (45) does is repair the reported absence of conditions on the predicate Hold
by requiring that the relevant crossing event have its culminated counterpart on its
continuation branch in order to hold at t (Zucchi 1999, 194).
Now that I have sketched a formal analysis of progressive aspect that seems
more promising in view of the requirements on imperfective marking that emerged in
section 4.2, it is time to go back to the main issue: How do the truth-conditions pro-
posed for the progressive relate to the semantic instructions encoded by the imper-
fective aspect? And what do progressivity and habituality have in common?
Let us start with the latter question. On the basis of the foregoing discussion, we
can conclude that what progressives and habituals certainly have in common is the
fact that the truth-conditions we have defined for both of them clearly require eval-
uation with respect to a well-established set of possible worlds (modal base). In other
words, the point I wish to make is that the modal dimension that has been detected
in the analysis of habituals is also clearly required for an adequate analysis of the
truth-conditions of progressives. What remains to be shown is that the modal
dimension of progressives follows, as is arguably the case with habituals, from the
predicational format encoded by means of imperfective marking.
I would submit that this hypothesis is actually supported by a proper analysis of
the role played, in progressive sentences, by adverbs of temporal location. For in-
stance, in (40) (repeated here) the temporal adverbial provides the time at which the
crossing event is said to hold.
(40) Alle
at
cinque,
five
Teo
Teo
attraversava
crossed-imp
la
the
strada.
street
‘At five o’clock, Teo was crossing the street.’
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Adopting the insightful suggestions made by Jespersen (1924) and Kearns (1991),
we might express this fact by claiming that progressives express readings in which
the time of the event is somehow ‘‘framed’’ by the event itself. This would be consis-
tent with the event mereology involved in the semantics of progressive aspect, in full
agreement with my claim that imperfective marking is neutral with respect to the
culmination of the event(s). On the other hand, we have just seen that the conditions
on the predicate Hold at t crucially involve reference to the possible continuation of
the holding event, up to culmination. We can see the culminated event e 0 as framing
the evaluation time t at which a subpart of e 0—say, e—is said to hold.
My claim is that this ‘‘frame interpretation’’ is syntactically encoded by means of a
predicational format involving a subject-predicate structure. The subject of predica-
tion is the evaluation time t.
Let us consider this hypothesis in some detail. From the semantics of the progres-
sive sketched above, we derive the important consequence that, in speaking about
developing events, we are actually ‘‘framing’’ a certain time t, which acquires a sort
of conceptual prominence. The idea is that this intuitive prominence is formally
expressed by a logical format in which the framed time counts as a subject of predi-
cation. In this way, we clearly shift from a thetical to a categorical interpretation of
the progressive aspect. For a sentence like (46), the truth-conditions that most con-
veniently suit its logical form (a consequence of the predicational format in syntax)
are those informally spelled out in (47), rather than those spelled out in (48).
(46) At five o’clock, Teo was eating an apple.
(47) The time five o’clock is such that an event of eating (by Teo) was developing
at it.
(48) There has been an event of eating (by Teo) that was developing at five o’clock.
There is some additional empirical evidence, from Italian, that this hypothesis is
on the right track. Bianchi, Squartini, and Bertinetto (1995) observe that punctual
adverbials necessarily occur, with progressive sentences, in positions outside the
‘‘predicative nucleus’’ of the sentence, that is, either right- or left-dislocated. Occur-
rence in a nondislocated position (i.e., postverbally and with unmarked intonation)
yields ungrammaticality. The relevant paradigm is given in (49), where the progres-
sive reading is encoded by means of the imperfect.
(49) a. Alle cinque, Teo mangiava.
‘At five o’clock, Teo ate-IMP.’
b. Teo mangiava, alle cinque.
‘Teo ate-IMP, at five.’
c. #Teo mangiava alle cinque.
‘Teo ate-IMP at five.’
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The most noticeable fact about (49) is that it is not the case that (49c) is simply
ungrammatical with the imperfect. Rather, it is ungrammatical under the progressive
reading of the imperfect. Under the habitual reading (‘In the relevant period, Teo
used to eat at five o’clock’), (49c) is fully acceptable. Bianchi, Squartini, and Berti-
netto (1995) explain (49) by assuming that the punctual temporal adverbs involved
denote a perspective point P by means of which the speaker ‘‘introduces a particular
perspective on the event’’ (p. 320). They also propose that ‘‘the syntactic prominence
of P is related to its prominence in the informational structure of the text’’ (p. 320).
Notice that the framework I have developed permits an elegant translation of all
these insights. The punctual adverbs that undergo dislocation are exactly those
adverbs that most readily allow a ‘‘frame interpretation.’’ The contextual promi-
nence can be naturally understood in terms of the ‘‘framing e¤ect’’ described above.
Last but not least, syntactic prominence should be understood in terms of predica-
tion: whatever the final syntactic position of the punctual adverb may be, it is my
claim that the movement path of the adverb crucially involves displacement to the
PredP layer, as a result of the aspectual information encoded on the verb (i.e., the
semantic instruction according to which the VP must be interpreted as a ‘‘predi-
cative’’ category that ascribes a property to an object). Under the hypothesis that
temporal adverbs expressing the event time occur VP-internally (see Larson 1988;
Bertinetto and Delfitto 2000), the requirement that they be displaced to Spec,PredP
yields a categorical structure in which they count as subject of predication. The result
of this analysis is that the sentence in (40) is assigned the logical form in (50).
(50) [lt (be [crossing(e)bAgent(Teo, e)bTheme(e, the street)bAT(e, t)b
Hold(e, t, :le [crossing(e)bTheme(e, the street)])])] (five o’clock)
Compare the logical form in (50) with the logical representation that I proposed for
habitual sentences, as exemplified in (39). In both cases, we have a property ascribed
to a subject (the l-abstract corresponding to the VP is interpreted intensionally). In
order to reach this result, I have simply capitalized on the two essential semantic
ingredients of imperfective morphology:
1. the fact that it encodes a predicative interpretation of the VP and
2. the fact that it expresses neutral information with respect to the ontological con-
stitution of the event.
We have seen that both habituals and progressives are based on a predicational for-
mat. As for claim 2, neutrality manifests itself in the fact that habituals typically
involve culminated events, whereas progressives normally refer to holding events. Of
course, I have not explained how a speaker, given a sentence with imperfective
marking, can disambiguate between a progressive reading and a habitual one (by
deciding, for instance, which of the arguments of the verb gets interpreted as the
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subject of predication). In fact, as far as we know, this might be the product of a
complex interplay of syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic factors that remain to be
sorted out. However, notice that given an imperfective sentence like (51a) in a non-
narrative context, there is full ambiguity, in Italian, between the progressive and the
habitual readings.
(51) a. Teo mangiava una mela.
‘Teo ate-IMP an apple.’
b. ‘Teo was eating an apple.’
c. ‘Teo used to eat an apple.’
We can interpret this ambiguity as evidence that, as far as the semantics of the im-
perfect goes, the choice between the two readings is entirely free. This is so because
the semantic constraints encoded by imperfective morphology are flexible enough
to leave extra room for distinct interpretive choices. The point is that imperfective
morphology expresses interpretive constraints (concerning the intensional interpreta-
tion of an abstract predicational format) that are compatible with both readings. The
semantic instructions encoded in morphosyntax constrain interpretation by inducing
an abstract subject-predicate format, without deciding, however, between the pro-
gressive and the habitual readings.
4.4 The Present Tense Paradox
In the 1970s, Gregory Carlson proposed an elegant analysis according to which bare
subjects (i.e., determinerless noun phrases occurring as subjects) can be interpreted
existentially only if they combine with stage-level predicates (essentially, predicates
expressing reports on the passing scene) (Carlson 1980). Subsequent empirical re-
search led to the conclusion that the data are in fact, from this theoretical per-
spective, quite paradoxical: existential readings are also found with individual-level
predicates, as is the case in (52), while there are stage-level predicates that do not
license the existential interpretation of their subjects, as can be seen in (53). Both sets
of facts are quite puzzling in Carlson’s perspective.
(52) Typhoons arise in this part of the Pacific.
‘It is a property of this part of the Pacific that some typhoons arise in it.’
(53) Firemen are joyful/invisible/on holiday.
!bx (fireman(x)b joyful/invisible/on holiday(x))
On the basis of the class of facts exemplified by (52), Kratzer (1995) proposed a sub-
stantial revision of Carlson’s theory, according to which bare nouns are interpreted
as introducing a restricted variable that is quantified over by the variable-taking
operators b and Gen. Within Kratzer’s analysis, stage-level predicates are interpreted
134 Denis Delfitto
as those predicates that express a temporary property of individuals and di¤er from
individual-level predicates (which refer to permanent properties of individuals) in
argument structure terms. More exactly, there are two relevant argument structure
properties. The first concerns the fact that, unlike individual-level predicates, stage-
level predicates are endowed, with a (possibly implicit) spatiotemporal argument
expressing spatial or temporal location. In this way, one can account for the inter-
pretation associated with (52) by simply assuming that the variable introduced by the
bare subject is quantified over by b, whereas Gen binds the variable introduced by
the overt locative. This leads to the logical representation in (53), which provides the
desired reading of (52).
(54) Gen(l ) [this-part-of-the-Pacific(l )] bx [typhoon(x)barise-in(x, l )]
This hypothesis also provides an adequate logical representation of sentences such as
(55), where there is no overt locative, under the assumption that the abstract location
argument associated with stage-level predicates need not be phonetically realized in
order to be syntactically represented. The relevant logical form is given in (56).
(55) Firemen are available.
(56) Gen(l ) [here(l )] bx [fireman(x)bavailable(x, l )]
‘There are typically some firemen available around here.’
The second di¤erence in argument structure proposed by Kratzer is that the subject
of individual-level predicates cannot be in the scope of the existential operator (this
result is achieved, technically, by stipulating that the syntactic domain of existential
quantification is the VP and that subjects of individual-level predicates are generated
outside the VP and cannot be reconstructed VP-internally). This second property is
needed in order to correctly exclude the existential reading of sentences like (57),
shown in (58). Namely, notice that nothing prevents b from quantifying over the
variable introduced by the subject, unless it is explicitly assumed that this variable
falls outside the scope of b.
(57) Typhoons are dangerous.
(58) bx [typhoon(x)bdangerous(x)]
Here, I would like to argue that Kratzer’s analysis, in spite of its attractive fea-
tures, is empirically untenable. In particular, there are no argument structure di¤er-
ences between stage-level predicates and individual-level predicates. The point is that
it is not di‰cult to find predicates that express temporary properties but do not
admit an existential interpretation of their subject. A sentence such as (59) should
license both interpretations in (60) according to Kratzer’s analysis: (60a) corresponds
to the reading in which the variable introduced by the subject, being reconstructed
Logical Form of Imperfective Aspect 135
VP-internally, is in the scope of b, while (60b) corresponds to the reading in which
b is in the scope of the quasi-universal quantifier on spatiotemporal variables.
(59) Typhoons arise suddenly.
(60) a. bx (typhoon(x)barise-suddenly(x))
‘There are typhoons that arise suddenly.’
b. Gen(l ) [here(l )] bx [typhoon(x)barise-suddenly(x)]
‘There are typically typhoons that arise suddenly around here.’
The unavailability of both readings in (60) is entirely unexpected, especially if we
consider that the predicate arise-suddenly gives rise to the kind of semantic ambi-
guities that are proper, according to Kratzer, to stage-level predicates. Namely, a
sentence like (61) can be interpreted, in the appropriate contexts, both as (62a) and
as (62b).
(61) Almost all diseases arise suddenly in tropical countries.
(62) a. ‘Almost all diseases arise suddenly when they happen to arise in tropical
countries.’
b. ‘Almost all diseases in tropical countries arise suddenly.’
Another relevant case concerns the di¤erence between transitive predicates and uner-
gative predicates. In the literature, it is often emphasized that sentences such as (63),
involving a stage-level transitive predicate, are easily interpreted, modulo some pro-
sodic and contextual factors, as licensing an existential interpretation of the subject
(‘It is a property of modern planes that there are some computers that route them’).
(63) Computers route modern planes.
Now, it is a fact that neither context nor prosody can rescue an existential reading of
the subject in sentences involving the kind of unergative predicates instantiated in
(64).
(64) a. Students work hard.
b. Professors wear a tie.
c. Italians drive fast.
In the case of (64a), for instance, both interpretations shown in (65) are completely
excluded.
(65) a. bx (student(x)bwork-hard(x))
‘There are students who work hard.’
b. Gen(l ) [here(l ) bx [student(x)bwork-hard(x)]
The unavailability of the existential readings in (60a) and (65a) clearly suggests
that VP-internal reconstruction does not really discriminate between stage-level and
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individual-level predicates. If reconstruction were uniformly admissible for stage-
level predicates, we should expect both (60a) and (65a) to be legitimate readings,
contrary to the facts. One might argue that the existential reading of the subject is
indeed possible (via VP-internal reconstruction) but triggers an illegitimate vacuous
quantification configuration, owing to the absence of an appropriate bindee for the
Gen operator present in the structure. However, if this is the case, one predicts that
the prospects for the existential reading of the subject should improve if an appro-
priate bindee is actually added to the structure, in the form of the abstract location
argument proposed by Kratzer. Unfortunately, this prediction is not borne out, since
the logical forms in (60b) and (65b) do not correspond to legitimate interpretations
of (59) and (64a), respectively. On the basis of these facts, we are led to conclude that
the distribution of the existential readings cannot be easily reduced to the set of dif-
ferences in argument structure between stage-level and individual-level predicates
proposed by Kratzer.
Now, consider the following alternative hypothesis. Suppose that all present tense
sentences (since they involve imperfective marking) are interpreted ‘‘categorically,’’
that is, as the ascription of a property to a subject of predication, as argued in section
4.3. This means that all present tense sentences will have a subject of predication that
cannot be reconstructed, independently of the stage-level/individual-level distinction.
Of course, the subject of predication (i.e., the referential constituent that is displaced
to the PredP level) need not coincide with the grammatical subject, as repeatedly
emphasized in section 4.3. In this perspective, the relevant di¤erence between a sen-
tence like (52) and a sentence like (59) is that in the former, contrary to what happens
in the latter, there is a spatial location argument, distinct from the grammatical sub-
ject, that may count as a subject of predication. If this is what happens in (52), there
will be no need for the grammatical subject to be displaced to the PredP level.
Whatever the final syntactic position of the grammatical subject may be, VP-internal
reconstruction will be permitted and this will automatically turn the existential read-
ing of the subject into a legitimate construal. In (59), on the contrary, there is no
argument—besides the grammatical subject—to be ‘‘promoted’’ to the PredP level.
Displacement of the grammatical subject to the PredP level will be the only way to
ensure that the structure is interpreted categorically, as required by the semantic
instruction encoded by imperfective marking.
The same explanatory paradigm can now be applied to the analysis of the contrast
between transitive sentences like (63) and the intransitive sentences in (64). In (63)
there is a legitimate construal in which the direct object counts as the subject of
predication (with the grammatical subject reconstructed VP-internally), whereas
in (64) the grammatical subject necessarily coincides with the logical subject (this
arguably rules out the existential construal associated with VP-internal reconstruc-
tion). Notice that this style of explanation implies a complete rejection of Kratzer’s
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hypotheses. It is not true that predicates expressing a temporary property uniformly
license a (possibly null) spatiotemporal argument: if this were the case, the null
location argument might be promoted to logical subject in (59) and (64) and we
would be left without a principled explanation for the exclusion of the existential
reading of the grammatical subject. It is also not true that predicates expressing a
temporary property uniformly admit VP-internal reconstruction of their grammatical
subject: if this were the case, the existential interpretation of the grammatical subject
in (59) and (64) should be fully legitimate. In a nutshell, these remarks show that it is
preferable to replace the lexical opposition between stage-level and individual-level
predicates with the grammatical opposition between perfectively and imperfectively
marked predicates: the latter, which instantiate the default aspectual marking, uni-
formly encode a categorical interpretation of the sentence (hence a nonexistential in-
terpretation of the grammatical subject in all structures in which there is no extra
argument available as the logical subject). If this analysis is essentially correct, it
provides indirect empirical corroboration for the logical interpretation of aspectual
marking that I proposed in section 4.3: the absence of certain existential readings
clearly correlates with the categorical interpretation of all imperfectively marked
sentences.
In fact, I believe there is another nice extension of this explanatory paradigm,
which somehow completes the resolution of the present tense paradox. Consider the
following facts. In the literature, there is widely considered to be a large set of non-
verbal heads that behave quite di¤erently from predicates like to be available in (55),
even though they express a rather extreme sort of temporary property, namely, a
report on contingent events or states (‘‘reports on the passing scene’’). Some of them
have already been instantiated in (53). Other examples are given in (66) (see Delfitto
2002a and the references quoted therein).
(66) Firemen are rich/sad/hungry.
What we should manage to explain is why a null location argument is arguably
licensed with predicates like available in (55) and completely excluded with the kind
of predicate in (66). From Kratzer’s perspective, all these predicates should qualify
as stage-level (they clearly refer to temporary properties). This shows that what is
relevant for an explanation is certainly not the boundary between stage-level and
individual-level predicates. As originally noted by Higginbotham and Ramchand
(1996), predicates such as available involve a notion of spatiotemporal location in the
form of spatiotemporal proximity to the speaker: available in (55) actually means
something like ‘available around here’ (at least whenever the sentence is uttered in an
‘‘out-of-the-blue’’ context). Licensing of a null location argument thus correlates with
the assignment of a default indexical reading: only the cases where speaker orienta-
tion is somehow encoded in the lexical meaning of the predicate will be cases where a
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phonetically silent location argument is syntactically licensed and possibly promoted
to logical subject. There is in fact a striking empirical observation that strongly cor-
roborates the hypothesis that predicates allowing existential readings are predicates
expressing the speaker’s point of view. There is a systematic correlation between the
availability of existential readings in English and the availability of postverbal sub-
jects with unmarked interpretation in Italian. To see this, let us consider the follow-
ing English predicates, all allowing an existential reading of the subject:
(67) a. Firemen are available.
b. Firemen are on strike.
c. Firemen are nearby.
The Italian equivalents of (67) are sentences involving a postverbal realization of
the subject. This subject is not necessarily interpreted as the only focused constituent
of the sentence (narrow focus); rather, the whole sentence is easily interpreted pre-
sentationally, in terms of an ‘‘all-focus sentence’’ (‘There are some firemen available/
on strike/nearby’). The relevant examples are given in (68).
(68) a. Sono
are
disponibili
available
pompieri/
firemen
i pompieri.
the firemen
‘There are firemen available around here.’
‘Firemen are available around here.’
b. Sono
are
in sciopero
on strike
pompieri/
firemen
i pompieri.
the firemen
‘There are firemen on strike around here.’
‘Firemen are on strike around here.’
c. Ci
there
sono
are
qui
here
vicino
nearby
pompieri/
firemen
i pompieri.
the firemen
‘There are firemen nearby.’
‘Firemen are nearby.’
As the English translations show, all sentences in (68) involve spatiotemporal prox-
imity to the speaker whenever interpreted ‘‘out of the blue.’’ Apparently, licensing a
neutral interpretation of the postverbal subject involves licensing of a null location
argument expressing spatiotemporal proximity to the speaker. This empty spatio-
temporal argument is likely to play a crucial role in ensuring that inversion structures
are syntactically licensed while receiving an ‘‘all-focus’’ interpretation. A possibility
that comes to mind is that the Extended Projection Principle (EPP), or whatever
condition is assumed to subsume it (like checking of a strong D-feature in T in the
minimalist system of Chomsky 1995), is satisfied by covert displacement of the empty
locative to the relevant syntactic position. In this way, we predict that in intransi-
tive structures where there is no empty locative, it is the grammatical subject that
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obligatorily moves to Spec,T in order to satisfy the EPP. If the subject surfaces
postverbally, this position is arguably the result of some marked (i.e., informationally
related) rightward movement strategy: the subject moves rightward in order to find
itself in a position where it can be assigned ‘‘narrow focus’’ (a sort of ‘‘prosodic
movement’’ in the sense of Zubizarreta 1995). This prediction is clearly borne out.
The Italian equivalents of (66) (for which I have argued that the ban on the existen-
tial reading of the subject depends on the absence of an empty locative) are neces-
sarily interpreted with a narrow focus reading of the inverted subject: since the EPP
cannot be satisfied by the empty locative, the structure necessarily involves rightward
prosodic movement.
(69) a. *Sono ricchi pompieri/i pompieri.
(OK with narrow focus of the inverted subject)
‘There are rich firemen.’
‘Firemen are rich.’
b. *Sono tristi pompieri/i pompieri.
(OK with narrow focus of the inverted subject)
‘There are sad firemen.’
‘Firemen are sad.’
c. *Sono a¤amati pompieri/i pompieri.
(OK with narrow focus of the inverted subject)
‘There are hungry firemen.’
‘Firemen are hungry.’
The proposed correlation between existential reading of the subject in English and
unmarked subject inversion in Italian thus corroborates the view that the presence of
a null spatiotemporal argument is not a property of all stage-level predicates. In fact,
only a small fraction of stage-level predicates interpreted as reports on the passing
scene license empty locatives, whose presence is essential to the existential reading
of the subject. This is due to the fact that existential readings are based on the avail-
ability of a subject of predication distinct from the grammatical subject: for a sub-
set of the sentences interpreted as reports on the passing scene, this logical subject
can coincide with a phonetically unrealized location argument. This conclusion
shows that what is relevant to a proper understanding of the existential readings
is the aspectual opposition perfective/imperfective, and not the lexical opposition
stage-level/individual-level. It also provides additional empirical evidence for the
categorical status of progressives and, more generally, sentences expressing reports
on contingent events or states: in spite of their intuitive presentational status, these
sentences are uniformly associated with a subject-predicate logical form. It is this
logical form that arguably leads to a resolution of Carlson’s present tense paradox.
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4.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, I have argued against two influential analyses of imperfective mor-
phology: (i) the imperfect as an aspectually sensitive tense and (ii) the imperfect
as encoding quantification over individuals or events. The analysis I developed views
imperfective marking as encoding a predicational interpretation of the minimal
functional complex (VP) of the predicate to which it applies: imperfective sentences
are thus uniformly interpreted as the ascription of a property to an object/individual.
What the two most salient readings of the imperfect (the progressive reading and the
habitual reading) have in common is a predicational logical form and its concomi-
tant modal import. Imperfective morphology expresses default semantic instructions
(concerning culmination and predication) that do not discriminate between pro-
gressivity and habituality. Moreover, I have argued for the view that progressives are
not ‘‘thetical’’ sentences expressing reports on the passing scene. Rather, they have
the predicational format proper to generic sentences, a fact that helps clarify the
intriguing set of facts that I have dubbed the ‘‘present tense paradox.’’
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